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Fax:(435)623-1803
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS IN AND FOR
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff and Respondent. :
vs.

Case No. 20030189 CA

:

JAMES L. ROBISON,

:

Category No. 2

Defendant and Appellant. :
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §
78-2a-3(2) (f) Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the entry of Appellant's plea of guilty come as a result of the Court's full
compliance with the provisions of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
2. Did the Appellant understand the nature and elements of the offense?

3. Did the Appellant understand that his guilty plea was an admission of the
elements of the offense?
4. Was there a clear factual basis for the charge to which the guilty plea was
entered?
5. What was the plea agreement?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7 (Due Process of Law)
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11. Pleas
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The action in this case was initiated by an Information filed in Juab County, Utah
on the 24th day of October, 2001 wherein the Appellant was charged with criminal
offenses of: Count I, Issuing a Bad Check; Count II, Issuing a Bad Check; Count III,
Equity Skimming of a Vehicle (R.l). Count III, was dismissed at preliminary hearing,
then amended to a charge of Theft by Deception (R. 110).
The Appellant eventually entered a plea of guilty to Count I, Issuing a Bad Check.
However, within the time allowed, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea and raising
issues of the Trial Court's compliance with Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
This motion was denied, and Appellant filed his appeal of that ruling.
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STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Fourth
Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of Utah entered on March 4, 2003 denying
Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 2001, Appellant, a licensed vehicle dealer, acquired from Painter
Motor Company of Nephi, Utah, by oral agreement to purchase, a 2002 GMC K 2500
truck. On or about September 17, 2001, Appellant delivered his check to Painter Motor
Company in the sum of $40,812.00. This check and a subsequent check were dishonored
by the drawer banks. Between September 1 and September 17, Appellant had sold the
truck to a good faith purchaser, who paid in full for the truck. The payment funds were
never used to cover the checks, nor was any part delivered to Painter Motor. Criminal
proceedings were then initiated against Appellant.
The Appellant secured the services of Gary Weight as defense counsel and
initiated a defense of the case, including preliminary hearing, motions to suppress, and
requests for jury trial. During the course of these proceedings, discussions were had
regarding a resolution of the matter by a plea agreement. Nothing firm was
accomplished on the plea agreement and the matter was scheduled for trial. (R. 194)
After the case was scheduled for trial, Gary Weight, as legal counsel, filed a
request for continuance of trial. (R. 198) That request was denied and he then moved to
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be relieved as legal counsel for the Defendant. (R. 217)
As these matters were progressing, the discussion regarding the plea bargain was
intensified. Finally some tentative agreements on plea bargaining were reached and the
Defendant/Appellant appeared before the Honorable Donald J. Eyre, Jr., District Judge,
on the 16th day of October, 2002 for the purpose of entry of plea.
The Defendant/Appellant had discussed the proposed plea agreement at length
with his legal counsel and a Statement of Defendant in Support of No Contest Plea and
Certificate of Counsel was prepared and reviewed prior to the court appearance. (R. 247)
This Statement contemplated that the Defendant/Appellant would enter a plea of 'no
contest' to the second degree felony of Issuing a Bad Check.
As the parties appeared before Judge Eyre for the entry of the plea, controversy
arose over the exact terms of the plea agreement; with the County Attorney indicating
that he was not willing to accept a plea of "no contest'. This discussion took place in
open court and is contained within the transcript of the plea hearing. (R. 398) A reading
of the entire transcript is required for a full understanding of the facts.
The Defendant entered a plea of 'guilty' to the charge of a second-degree felony
of Issuing a Bad Check. The discussion included questions to the Defendant by Judge
Eyre regarding his acknowledgment of the elements of the offense.
When these questions were presented to the Defendant and he was asked if he
acknowledged committing the elements set forth, he indicated "No." Further discussion
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was had, but that issue was never really resolved and the Defendant never did admit to
committing the elements of the offense. However, the Judge accepted his 'guilty' plea
and the matter was scheduled for sentencing. The Defendant was sentenced.
Defendant/Appellant, on his own, filed a motion to withdraw his plea of 'guilty'.
(R. 252) The motion set forth the terms for the withdrawal of the guilty plea as then
considered by the Defendant/Appellant, who was acting as his own counsel. This
pleading discloses his confusion at the plea transaction and his continual denial of the
elements of the offense to which the plea was tendered.
The Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty was denied.
However, the Court did note the confusion and questions concerning certain issues
occurring during the plea hearing. (R. 280)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant claims the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. Consideration of such a motion is a privilege and is within the sound discretion of
the court and thus the standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. Mora, 472 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3 4. (Utah Ap. 2003)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant's guilty plea was entered under confusing, contentious circumstances,
using a written plea statement modified in open court, then containing contradictory
elements and the Appellant clearly denied the proposed offense elements. Thus the plea
was not voluntarily and knowingly tendered.
5

ARGUMENT
The Trial court filed to comply with the provision of Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, in the following respects:
A. Was there a clear statement as to the elements of the offense to which the plea
would be tendered?
B. Did Appellant admit his commission of the elements of the offense?
C. Was there a written plea agreement that was clear, consistent, and supportive
of the plea entered and the Court's compliance with the requirements of Rule 11?
This case involved the consideration of the facts evidenced by the State of the
record, including the initial form of the Statement By Defendant in Support of No
Contest Plea and Certificate of Counsel (R. 247) and the colloquy during the change of
plea hearing occurring before Judge Eyre on the date that the plea was entered (R. 398)
and the application of those facts to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
address the question of the Trial court's abuse of discretion in denying
Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Acceptance of a plea of guilty generally requires that the court determine that the
Defendant/Appellant accepts responsibility for the facts supporting the allegations of
guilty, acknowledges his commission of the egregious acts, acknowledges that he
understands his legal rights and that he is willing to waive those rights in favor of the
entry of the plea of guilty and he is acting freely and voluntarily. The pertinent
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provisions of Rule 11 are as follows:
Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be
represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court.
The defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a
reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty
by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in
the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant
refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the
court.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea under the court has
found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has
knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of
innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a
speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and crossexamine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, and that the plea is an admission of all of those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient
it if establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the
defendant or, if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit
culpability, that the prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a
substantial risk of conviction;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the
record or, if used, a sworn statement reciting these factors after the court
7

has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged
the contents of the sworn statement. If the defendant cannot understand the
English language, it will be sufficient that the sworn statement has been
read or translated to the defendant.
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to
any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
The application of Rule 11 in actual in-court settings has been reviewed by
appellate courts in the State of Utah on prior occasions and the following cases seem
pertinent to the instant appeal: State v. Martinez. 2001 Ut 12,26 P.3d 203; State v.
Gibbons, 1987 Ut, 740 P.2d 1309; State vs. Maioir. 1991 Ut, 830 P.2d 216; and State v.
Mora, 2003, Ut Ap. 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
The Defendant/Appellant represents to the Court that the important provisions of
Rule 11 to be considered by this Court as those found in Sections:
(e) (4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense . . . and that the plea is an admission of all those elements.
(e) (4) (B) there is a factual basis for the plea.
(e) (6) if the tendered plea is a result of prior plea discussion . . . what
agreement has been reached.
As to these provisions, the Defendant/Appellant represents to the Court that,
considering the slatus of the case, the fact that counsel for the Defendant/Appellant was
attempting to withdraw from representing him (R. 217); that request to continue the trial
date had been denied (R. 198); and further that the Defendant/Appellant understood that
there were no funds available to him to secure witnesses in his own behalf left him in an
extremely depressed, anxious, and unbalanced mental state with regard to fairly
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accepting a plea statement. This state of mind should have been considered by the Trial
Court as the plea proceedings were undertaken.
The Defendant/Appellant enters into the plea process in that frame of mind. He is
confronted by controversy erupting in open court as he is prepared to plead 'no contest'.
Then and there, learning that such a plea was unacceptable and no break was taken to
allow Defendant/ Appellant to talk to his counsel. The matter continued in open court
before the Judge and essentially counsel for the parties and the Court then negotiated the
plea to be tendered and accepted by the Court. However, from the statements made in
that plea negotiation process, it is clear that there was no satisfactory compliance with
Rule 11. In particular, the Defendant/Appellant never did acknowledge, and has never
acknowledged, his guilt with regard to the commission of the acts which were the
elements of the charge to which he entered the guilty plea. There was no clear factual
basis for the plea and clearly there was no meeting of the minds of what plea agreement
had been reached. A referral to the Entry of Plea Transcript (R. 398) reveals this
important dialogue:
Page 3, line 7

G. WEIGHT:

I have prepared a statement of defendant
in support of a no contest plea to issuing
a bad check.

Page 3, line 16

D. LEAVITT:

We said that in exchange for the no
contest it would be theft by deception.
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Page 4, line 8

D. LEAVITT:

Well, he can take his pick. He can have
guilty to the bad check or no contest to a
theft by deception.

Page 4, line 14

G. WEIGHT:

Well, I guess we don't have a deal, Your
Honor.

Page 5, line 1

J. ROBISON:

Well, there was no intention to . . . no
intention to a, steal this truck.

Page 6, line 22

J. ROBISION:

. check in existing on an existing debt
and not of obtaining ..

Page 7, line 15

G. WEIGHT:

Well, I don't think we have a deal.

Page 9, line 1

JUDGE EYRE:

Do you have questions?

Page 9, line 5

J. ROBISON:

I do.

Page 20, line 11

D. LEAVITT:

Factual basis, this defendant... issued a
check or draft a, in exchange for
something of value at a time when the
account upon which it was written was
closed

Page 20, line 16

That is not a correct statement, Your

J. ROBISON:

Honor.
Quoting direct from Page 21, emphasis added:
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JUDGE EYRE:

Okay. You, you did issue a check which
was not honored by your bank. Is that
correct?

J. ROBISON:

That's correct.

JUDGE EYRE:

And a, upon notice of it not being
honored did you, did you at any time
make that check good?
I attempted to5 Your Honor, and my

J. ROBISON:

bonding company also attempted to, but
we were not able to completely do it.
Okay. And, a, in exchange for that a car

JUDGE EYRE:

was delivered. Is that correct? A
vehicle was J. ROBISON:

No. The car was delivered several
weeks prior to that.

JUDGE EYRE:

Well, I mean -

J. ROBISON:

There was a vehicle in, a transaction did
involve a vehicle.
Yes. Okay. And that vehicle had a

JUDGE EYRE:

value in excess of $5,000?
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J. ROBISON:

It did, Your Honor.

JUDGE EYRE:

The Court finds there's a factual basis
accepts your guilty plea, finds it was
voluntarily and knowingly given with a
full understanding of your constitutional
rights.

Under the conditions pending, there was a requirement that the Court be much
more cautious in accepting that plea than in usual cases because the Court was aware that
the Defendant/Appellant understood that there were not funds available for him to have
an adequate defense, that his legal counsel was in the imminent process of resigning.
Under such circumstance, it was error on the Court's part to accept the plea when
it was fully obvious that there was controversy between counsel which may have now
been clearly understood by the Defendant/Appellant. A written plea statement was being
used which was originally designed to present a 'no contest' plea. The statement was
modified by crossing out 'no contest' and inserting 'guilty' nine (9) times, but continued
with the words 'no contest' seventeen (17) times:
'No contest' changed to 'guilty'
2 times onfirstpage
2 times on second page
1 time on third page
4 times on fourth page

(R. 247)
(R. 246)
(R. 245)
(R. 244)
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'No contest' unchanged
1 time on first page
5 times on second page
6 times on third page
1 time on fourth page
4 times on fifth page

(R. 247)
(R. 246)
(R. 245)
(R. 244)
(R. 243)

Furthermore, the Defendant/Appellant was denying the essential elements of the crime to
which the plea of'guilty' was being accepted.
The appropriate action to have been taken was to have the matter recessed so that
the Defendant/Appellant would have a full opportunity to talk with his counsel and that
he and his counsel together could represent to the Court that they understood all of the
requirements of entry of the guilty plea and that the Defendant/Appellant, with that
understanding, could voluntarily enter the plea.
The burden the State carries in such cases is to ensure that a Defendant knows of
his rights and thereby understands the consequences of a decision to plead guilty.
Clearly, the then-existing circumstances did not arise to this level.
The plea should not have been accepted and the motion to allow the
Defendant/Appellant to withdraw that plea should have been granted by the Court. The
denial of such a motion is an abuse of the Trial court's discretion.
There is no loss to the State or to society by withdrawal of the plea. All of the
evidence necessary to support the initial charges is still available, has not diminished, and
no parties are prejudiced if the Defendant/Appellant's motion is granted. The State then

13

has full opportunity to prosecute the Defendant/Appellant.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea should have been
granted considering the confusing proceedings in taking the plea. The trial court erred in
denying the motion and the appellate court should now overturn the trial court's ruling
and direct that the Defendant/Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea be granted
and the case be reinstated as in its first and former state as it was prior to the entry of the

Respectfully submitted this

day of September, 2003.
MILTON T. HARMON
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING OR DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I mailed or delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Defendant-Appellant to:
Utah Attorney General's Office
Appeals Division
P.O. Box 140811
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

Mr. Jim Robison

Mr. Jared W. Eldridge
Juab County Attorney
160 North Main Street, #212
Nephi, UT 84648
first-class postage prepaid, and by facsimile to the Utah Court of Appeals at (801) 5783999 and the Utah Attorney General at (801) 366-0167, this
day of September,
2003.
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ADDENDUM

Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 7 (Due Process of Law)
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2) (f)
Rule 11, Pleas (Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure)
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
PREAMBLE

Article
I.
II.
III.

Declaration of Rights
State Boundaries
Ordinance

IV. Elections and Right of Suffrage
V. Distribution of Powers
VI. Legislative Department
VII. Executive Department
VEIL Judicial Department
DC. Congressional and Legislative Apportionment
X. Education
XI. v Local Governments
XII. Corporations
XIII. Revenue and Taxation
XIV. Public Debt
XV. Militia
XVI. Labor
XVII. Water Rights
XVIII. Forestry
XDC. Public Buildings and State Institutions
XX. Public Lands
XXI. Salaries
XXII. Miscellaneous
XXIII. Amendment and Revision
XXIV. Schedule
PREAMBLE
Grateful to Almighty God for life and liberty, we, the people
of Utah, in order to secure and perpetuate the principles of
free government, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION.
1896
ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Section
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.!
2. [All political power inherent in the people.!
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.!
4.f [Religious liberty!
5. [Habeas corpus.]
6. [Right to bear arms.]
7. [Due process of law.]
8. [Offenses bailable.].
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments.]

LO.
LI.
L2.
13.
L4.

[Trial by jury.]
[Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
[Rights of accused persons.]
[Prosecution by information or indictment — Grand jury.]
[Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant.]
.5. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.]
.6. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
.7. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
8.
9.
!0.
!1.
12.
!3.
4.
5.
6.

[Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
[Treason defined — Proof.]
[Military subordinate to the civil power.]
[Slavery forbidden.] •
[Private property for public use.]
[Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
[Uniform operation of laws.]
[Rights retained by people.]
[Provisions mandatory and prohibitory]

Section
27. [Fundamental rights.]
28. [Declaration of the rights of crime victims.]

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and
defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property; to worship according to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against wrongs, and
petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of t h a t
right.
1896

Sec, 2. [All political power inherent in the people.]
AJ1 political power is inherent in the people; and all free
governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or
reform their government as the public welfare may require.
1896

Sec. 3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
The State of U t a h is an inseparable part of the Federal
Union and the Constitution of the United States is the
supreme law of the land.
*
1896
S e c . 4. [Religious liberty.]
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed, The State
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; no religious test shall be
required as a qualification for any office of public trust or for
any vote at any election; nor shall any person be incompetent
as a witness or juror on account of religious belief or the
absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State,
nor shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its
functions. No public money or property shall be appropriated
for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction,
or for the support of any ecclesiastical establishment.
1999

Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.]
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety requires it.
1896
S e c . 6. [Right to b e a r arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for
security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the
state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature
from defining the lawful use of arms.
1984 (2nd S.S.)
S e c . 7. [Due p r o c e s s of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
1896
S e c . 8. [Offenses bailable.]
(1) All persons charged with a crime shall be bailable
except:
(a) persons charged with a capital offense when there is
substantial evidence to support the charge; or
(b) persons charged with a felony while on probation or
parole, or while free on bail awaiting trial on a previous
felony charge, when there is s u b s t a n t i a l evidence to
support the new felony charge; or
(c) persons charged with any other crime, designated
by statute as one for which bail may be denied, if there is
substantial evidence to support the charge and the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the person
would constitute a substantial danger to any other person

JUDICIAL CODE

78-2-7
78-2-7,

Repealed.

1986

78-2-7*5, S e r v i c e of sheriff t o court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the,state.
1988
78-2-8 to 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986,1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF A P P E A L S
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.
78-2a-6.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court of Appeals.
Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records
and information — Governmental immunity.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of
Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for
the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n .
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
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(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, include
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction or charge of a first
degree felony or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
'
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parenttime, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
2001
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of a c t i o n s b y S u p r e m e Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court ofAppeals may perform any of its functions in
any location within the state.
1986
78-2a-6.

A p p e l l a t e Mediation Office — P r o t e c t e d
r e c o r d s a n d information — G o v e r n m e n t a l im-

munity.
(1) Unless a more restrictive rule of court is adopted pursuant to Subsection 63-2-20l(3)(b), information and records
relating to any matter on appeal received or generated by the
Chief Appellate Mediator or other staff of the Appellate
Mediation Office as a result of any party's participation or lack
of participation in the settlement program shall be maintained as protected records pursuant to Subsections 63-2304(16), (17), (18), and (33).
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case now pending before the court with undivided loyalty to
the defendant;
(c)(3) the extent to which the attorneys under consideration
have engaged in the active practice of criminal law in the past
five years;
(c)(4) the diligence, competency and ability of the attorneys
being considered; and
(c)(5) any other factor which may be relevant to a determination that counsel to be appointed will fairly, efficiently and
effectively provide representation to the defendant.
(d) In all cases where an indigent defendant is sentenced to
death, the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such defendant on appeal and shall make a finding
that counsel is proficient in the appeal of capital cases. To be
found proficient to represent on appeal persons sentenced to
death, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys
must meet the following requirements:
(d)(1) at least one attorney must have served as counsel in
at least three felony appeals; and
(d)(2) at least one attorney must have attended and completed within the past five years an approved continuing legal
education course which deals, in substantial part, with the
trial or appeal of death penalty cases.
(e) In all cases in which counsel is appointed to represent
an indigent petitioner pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a202(2)(a), the court shall appoint one or more attorneys to
represent such petitioner at post-conviction trial and on postconviction appeal and shall make a finding that counsel is
qualified to represent persons sentenced to death in postconviction cases. To be found qualified, the combined experience of the appointed attorneys must meet the following
requirements:
(e)(1) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
served as counsel in at least three felony or post-conviction
appeals;
(e)(2) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
appeared as counsel or co-counsel in a post-conviction case at
the evidentiary hearing, on appeal, or otherwise demonstrated
proficiency in the area of post-conviction litigation;
(e)(3) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
attended and completed or taught within the past five years
an approved continuing legal education course which dealt, in
substantial part, with the trial and appeal of death penalty
cases or with the prosecution or defense of post-conviction
proceedings in death penalty cases;
(e)(4) at least one of the appointed attorneys must have
tried to judgment or verdict three civil jury or felony cases
within the past four years or ten cases total; and
(e)(5) the experience of at least one of the appointed attorneys must total not less than five years in the active practice
of law.
(f) Mere noncompliance with this rule or failure to follow
the guidelines set forth in this rule shall not of itself be
grounds for establishing that appointed counsel ineffectively
represented the defendant at trial or on appeal.
(g) Cost and attorneys' fees for appointed counsel shall be
paid as described in Chapter 32 of Title 77.
(h) Costs and attorneys fees for post-conviction counsel
shall be paid p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-202(2)(c).
R u l e 9. R e p e a l e d .
R u l e 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in
single court.
(l)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may
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defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a single court t h a t
has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(1Kb) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not be separated except by order of the court and
for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is adjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction
over all the offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial entity
shall prosecute the offenses.
R u l e 10. A r r a i g n m e n t .
(a) Upon the return of an indictment or upon receipt of the
records from the magistrate following a bind-over, the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court. Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist
of reading the indictment or information to the defendant or
stating to him the substance of the charge and calling on him
to plead thereto. He shall be given a copy of the indictment or
information before he is called upon to plead.
(b) If upon arraignment the defendant requests additional
time in which to plead or otherwise respond, a reasonable time
may be granted.
(c) Any defect or irregularity in or want or absence of any
proceeding provided for by statute or these rules prior to
arraignment shall be specifically and expressly objected to
before a plea of guilty is entered or the same is waived.
(d) If a defendant has been released on bail, or on his own
recognizance, prior to arraignment and ^thereafter fails to
appear for arraignment or trial when required to do so, a
w a r r a n t of arrest may issue and bail may be forfeited.
R u l e 11. P l e a s .
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant
shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives
counsel in open court. The defendant shall not be required to
plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer
with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not
guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A
defendant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty
by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a
plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent
of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case
shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant unable to make
bail shall be given a preference for an early trial. In cases
other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or
counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for
a jury trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no
contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea
until the court has found:
(e)(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or
she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not
desire counsel;
(e)(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(e)(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption
of innocence, the right against compulsory self-incrimination,
the right to a speedy public trial before an impartial jury, the
right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense
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(e)(4)(A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea is
an admission of all those elements;
(e)(4)(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis
is sufficient if it establishes that the charged crime was
actually committed by the defendant or, if the defendant
refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial
risk of conviction;
(e)(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum
sentence, and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of
the minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility of the
imposition of consecutive sentences;
(e)(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea agreement, and if so, what agreement has been
reached;
(e)(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw the plea; and
(e)(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of
appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used, a written statement reciting
these factors after the court has established that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of
the statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be sufficient that the statement has
been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not
required to inquire into or advise concerning any collateral
consequences of a plea.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for
filing any motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill is not a ground for setting the plea
aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to make
a motion under Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any
other party has agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of
other charges, the agreement shall be approved by the court.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the
court, the court shall advise the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions
prior to any plea agreement being made by the prosecuting
attorney.
(h)(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached,
the judge, upon request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in
advance of the time for tender of the plea. The judge may then
indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(h)(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should
not be in conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall
advise the defendant and then call upon the defendant to
either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of
guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in the
record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A
defendant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally
ill, in addition to the other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time to determine if
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the defendant is mentally ill in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. § 77-16a-103.
Rule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion. A motion other than one made during a trial or
hearing shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits.
It shall state with particularity the grounds upon which it is
made and shall set forth the relief sought. It may be supported
by affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be
raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be
raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(b)(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection shall
be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the
proceeding;
(b)(2) motions to suppress evidence;
(b)(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(b)(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or
(b)(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to
trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from
such waiver.
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including
such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or
information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.
Rule 13. Pretrial conference.
(a) The trial court, in its discretion, may hold a pretrial
conference, with trial counsel present, to consider such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. The accused
shall be present unless he waives his right to appear.
(b) At the conclusion of the conference, a pretrial order shall
set out the matters ruled upon. Any stipulations made shall be
signed by counsel, approved by the court and filed, and shall'
be binding upon the parties at trial, on appeal, and in
postconviction proceedings unless set aside or modified by the
court.
Rule 14. Subpoena.
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance of a witness or
interpreter before a court, magistrate or grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation or prosecution may be
issued by the magistrate with whom an information is filed,
the prosecuting attorney on his or her own initiative or upon
the direction of the grand jury, or the court in which an
information or indictment is to be tried. The clerk of the court
in which a case is pending shall issue in blank to the
defendant, without charge, as many signed subpoenas as the

